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The provision of municipal services by private contractors and cooperative 
arrangements has become increasingly prevalent in the US.  Building on previous studies 
in Illinois and Wisconsin we attempt to model the municipal decision of how local 
governments provide residents with town services.  In order to test the applicability of 
past work to smaller towns we conducted a survey of the mostly rural state of New 
Hampshire in the summer of 2004.  This paper will provide descriptive statistics of this 
New Hampshire survey.  We will then begin to outline a possible decision-making model 
relative to population, location and other exogenous factors.  Our analysis will use logit 
analysis to model the decision to contract out to for profit service providers.   
 
1.  Introduction  
 
Town government is an institution that has been part of the American political 
system for longer and more consistently than nearly any other level of organization.  
Within this longstanding tradition of local control there are a wide variety of management 
paradigms.  A somewhat recent development has been an interest in contracting out the 
provision of services in order to improve quality and reduce spending.  The theoretical 
prospect of competitively bid service contracts providing superior quality at low costs is 
certainly attractive to all towns.  The examination of this trend in rural districts has begun 
in a few places in the Midwest.  This thesis will document the occurrence and utility of 
private contracting in New Hampshire towns as well as begin to examine predictors of 
the shift to contracting and its success. 
 
1.1. The Prospect of Contracting Out  
 
Towns are constantly seeking to maximize the services provided to a demanding 
electorate while maintaining a fairly constant and publicly scrutinized town budget.  In 
the face of shrinking revenues, local governments are left with three major options 
[Deller, 1998]: (1) cut back on services offered; (2) eliminate the service completely and 
allow market forces to determine if the private sector provides the service; or (3) find 
more efficient ways to provide necessary services, via consolidation of local governments 
or cooperative agreements for service production.  The fourth major option Deller 
provides, and the one of most interest, is retention of government responsibility in 
determining provision of the service while utilizing private contractors to reduce 
production costs.  This fourth option is commonly lumped with the second under the heading of privatization.  This paper uses the term privatization to refer to municipal 
contracts with private firms not the elimination of public involvement in the decision to 
provide a service. 
 
Despite the theoretical prospects of competitively bidding contracts these are not 
necessarily the impetus for awarding contracts.  Rapid changes in needs, the seasonal 
nature of some services or the inability to make capital investments may make the 
flexibility of contracting more desirable than cost savings.  In addition the specialization 
of the contract provider may provide improvements in quality.  On the other hand, many 
services provided by the public sector have not been traditionally profitable.  The same 
small population that makes contracting to a specialized provider attractive may hamper 
profitability and discourage bids.  There is also some fear that once a contract is initiated 
a town may have very little recourse to deal with suddenly escalating prices or very poor 
service.  The utilization of contracts also may place an additional burden on towns to 




This paper will use data gathered in the summer of 2004 through a mail survey 
targeted at officials in each of the 234 municipalities in New Hampshire.  The survey 
followed a standard protocol [Dillman, 2000] and produced usable survey data covering 
nearly sixty percent of New Hampshire towns.  According to 2003 Office of Energy and 
Planning Statistics this sample also encompassed just over sixty percent of the total state 
population.  Our methods follow similar work done in Illinois and Wisconsin.  The 
survey targeted town managers and chairs of the board of selectman as the primary 
contacts.  Only one completed survey was requested from each town and data was 
collected on the fiscal trends affecting the town, decision-making processes and town 
employees in addition to the information on services.  The responses provided a great 
deal of heterogeneous information due to the unique nature of individual towns.  These 
responses and comments will serve to inform the qualitative descriptions of current 
management strategies.  The information on service provision was taken in a more 
uniform manner in order to enable quantitative analysis of the decision to contract out.  
The survey format of using both discrete and open-ended responses allows for both 
quantitative and qualitative descriptions of municipal service decisions. 
 
1.3. The New Hampshire Case Study 
 
The state of New Hampshire is unique in a number of aspects including its small 
size, strong municipal government and rural demographics.  Additionally the time period 
over which this study was done is a period of large state deficit and general economic 
downturn.  This is different than the context of similar studies, which occurred prior to a 
broad economic downturn after 2000.  New Hampshire also represents the New England 
region as opposed to previous studies in the mid-west.  Politically the state has had long 
term fiscally conservative majorities in both chambers of the state house and has a 
reputation for smaller government and somewhat libertarian ideals.  The strength of local 
government in New Hampshire rests much more at the local level than with county government.  This prevalence of small political units is often cited as an impediment to 
regional planning and cooperative action.  Despite the relatively diminutive size of the 
state in both population and land area a great diversity of towns exist in everything from 
predominant industries to access to urban centers. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
  Privatization has been defined in a number of ways.  Kolderie distinguishes 
between the privatization of provision and privatization of production [Kolderie, 1986].  
Provision entails decisions about how much and what kind of service will be provided, 
while production is making those decisions a physical reality.  Complete privatization of 
provision as well as production unearths issues of equity and local control that may be 
especially inflammatory in rural areas [Kolderie, 1986].  We wish to discuss only the 
privatization of production of services.   
 
Privatization of production of services has also been commonly described as 
“contracting out” [Hirsch, 1995].  This contracting process allows the municipality to use 
competition in the bidding process to drive down costs.  Notable problems with this 
process include the lack of viable bidders for a contract and the inability of a municipality 
to negotiate a fair contract.  In some cases the group winning the contract may be within 
another branch of government or even in the same municipality as is the case when a 
public works department competes against private corporations for a service contract. 
  
A theoretical justification for privatization has been widely accepted in the 
literature [Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, 1961].  The basic tenets describe a government 
that becomes smaller and more responsive to citizen needs.  The smaller units of 
government essentially provide a multitude of service “bundles” at differing prices and 
allow citizens to vote with their feet by moving to a location with the right mix of 
services.  Others advocate privatization on the grounds that politicians cannot make 
strictly efficient decisions [Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996]. This theoretical context 
blends nicely with other general theories of market efficiency, and it has become 
increasingly popular with federal government.  Whether this popularity is driven by 
empirical evidence is debatable.    
 
  Some authors have shown the predictions of the public choice model to be 
inaccurate in real world applications.  Lyons and Lowery tested five propositions of 
public choice theory and found none of them to be significantly different in a fragmented 
government structure as opposed to a consolidated one [Lyons and Lowery, 1989].  A 
wider range of studies has addressed the fiscal aspects of privatization, but they too are 
mixed.  A number of authors point to a selection bias in examining cities that have 
successfully privatized, because it is unlikely they would have contracted out unless they 
knew prior to signing that they would save money.  A more valid study of privatization 
may be the census approach, which shows that contracting out is currently a very small 
percentage of municipal budgets [Hirsch, 1995]. 
   Although the privatization decision process has been studied for quite some time, 
the majority of the work has focused on urban centers.  While some of this may be 
transferable to smaller scales, it is clear that special conditions must arise at the low 
population densities found in much of the U.S.  The lack of competitive bidders, inability 
of small governments to enforce contracts, and multiple social roles of municipal 
employment all change the decision making process for smaller governments.  At the 
same time, federal trends have continued to push service production to smaller levels of 
government, which may be causing disproportionate fiscal crisis in rural areas [Deller, 
1998].  As cost savings are the most common rationale for pursuing privatization, it is not 
surprising that this fiscal pressure has kept it on the political agenda.  Recent work has 
been done within states to look at various mechanisms municipalities are using to reduce 
production costs [Deller, Hinds and Hinman, 2001].  In addition to fiscal stress as a 
mechanism, political ideology and patronage have been shown to influence the 
privatization decision [Chandler and Feuille, 1994; Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997]. 
 
3.  Methods 
 
3.1. New Hampshire Municipal Services Survey Design and Structure 
 
Our survey was designed to closely follow previous surveys in order to increase 
comparability.  Some minor changes included the addition of a question to determine the 
year a service was started and a question about population change.  Any changes were 
inserted and the order of questions was not changed from previous surveys.  The final 
survey is in Appendix I.  The survey is long and detailed creating some concern about 
respondent fatigue.  This was somewhat mitigated by the professional positions of the 
sample.  The survey also incorporates the most important questions for this project at the 
front end of the survey. 
 
3.2. Sample Selection 
 
In order to directly target municipal decision makers we worked with the New 
Hampshire Local Government Center (NHLGC) to create a sample.  The NHGLC 
provided a contact list of municipal officials for each of the 234 local governments in the 
state.  From this list one person from each town was selected with a preference given to 
the town manager or administrator.  In cases where smaller towns had no staff other than 
an administrative assistant the survey was directed to the chair of the board of selectmen.  
The survey also asked for the respondent’s name and position.  In larger towns there was 
a tendency to pass the survey around in order to find the most appropriate respondent.  
Targeting one individual initially helped to keep the survey from being lost in the shuffle.  
We did not differentiate between responses from elected and hired officials although we 
did record that data.  
 
Of the 234 towns surveyed 138 provided usable response and an additional dozen 
respondents with largely incomplete or blank surveys.  Our mailing list had only one 
inaccurate or undeliverable address.  Our response rate of 59 percent was only slightly lower than similar surveys.  The prevalence of small and unstaffed towns in our sample 
would seem to depress response on such a long survey but the support of the NHLGC and 
their many contacts yielded a more than satisfactory response.  For ease of discussion 
towns with fewer than 1000 residents are considered small, those with 5000 or greater are 
referred to as large and the middling group as medium.  The sample had a mean 
population of 5675 and a median of 2926 both of which correspond closely to the same 
statistics for the state as a whole. 
 
3.3. Statistical Analysis of Survey Data 
 
We construct three statistical models using logit regressions.  In the first statistical 
model we determine the predictive capacity of a number of demographic factors on the 
fiscal stress rating of the respondents.  Our second regression uses measures of overall 
fiscal stress, ideology and demographic data to model current privatization in a polled 
data set of eight services commonly contracted out in towns of all sizes.  Our third 
regression aims to model respondent stated future predicted changes in service 
management using current fiscal stress, ideology and demographic data.  We try to 
provide a more accurate model of overall fiscal stress, a model of current private 
contracting and a set of indicators for future private contract adoption. 
 
4.  Descriptive Results of the Municipal Survey 
 
4.1. Community Status and Outlook 
 
The degree to which municipalities pursue cost saving measures is in part due to 
their current fiscal status as well as their perceived future situation.  Survey respondents 
were asked to place their town in one of five categories of fiscal health.  While the 
responses to this question may be somewhat subjective they do in fact capture the 
perspective of key officials and helps shed light on their decision making process.  It is 
part of the mental framework these officials use in evaluating the many possible options 
for service production.   
 
The most common response describing the current situation for towns of all sizes 
was “adequate revenue but not able to expand services” (Table 1). Twelve of the one 
hundred and thirty eight respondents chose not to answer the question, many citing the 
overly simplistic categories as their reason for abstaining.  Towns of less than 1000 
people (n=27) seem to have the most optimistic view of their situation while medium and 
larger towns described inadequate revenues much more frequently.  This might indicate 
some bias caused by elected officials being the more frequent respondents in smaller 
towns compared to professional city managers in larger towns.  Acknowledging even 
tacitly the need for more revenue or services is generally an unpopular political position 
for those facing reelection. 
 
Table 1 
Rate the current financial condition|              Town Population 
of your municipality.               |     <1000     1000-4999   >5000 |     Total 
------------------------------------+---------------------------------+----------            
Adequate Revenue, Reducing Tax            5         10          4 |        19  Adequate Revenue, Not Expanding Services     17         30         19 |        66  
Inadequate Revenue, Not Reducing Services     3         16          9 |        28  
Inadequate Revenue, Reducing Services Some    1          5          5 |        11  
Inadequate Revenue, Reducing Services Greatly 1          1          0 |         2  
------------------------------------+---------------------------------+---------- 
                              Total |        27         62         37 |       126  
 
What are the financial prospects for your        Town Population 
municipality for the next five years?     <1000     1000-4999   >5000 |     Total 
------------------------------------+---------------------------------+----------            
Adequate Revenue, Reducing Tax  |         4         10          4 |        18 
Adequate Revenue, Not Expanding Services     16         27         18 |        61 
Inadequate Revenue, Not Reducing Services     4         14          5 |        23 
Inadequate Revenue, Reducing Services Some    1          9          8 |        18 
Inadequate Revenue, Reducing Services Greatly 1          0          1 |         2 
------------------------------------+---------------------------------+---------- 
                  Total |        26         60         36 |       122 
  
      In the next five years, |              Town Population 
will your municipality: |     <1000     1000-4999   >5000 |     Total 
-----------+---------------------------------+---------- 
       Increase Privatization |         1          4         10 |        15  
       Decrease Privatization |         0          3          0 |         3  
        Remain the Same |        23         37         14 |        74  
             Don’t Know |         4         24         15 |        43  
------------------------+---------------------------------+---------- 
                  Total |        28         68         39 |       135 
 
The respondents (n=122) gave a slightly more pessimistic view of the next five 
years.  Once again the larger towns seemed to be the most worried about cutting services 
due to inadequate revenues (Table 1).  Although the majority of towns foresaw adequate 
revenues in the future, more than ten percent saw some reductions in services coming.  
The trends by town size continued to show larger towns as the most concerned about 
inadequate revenues.  The survey next asked for information about the actual services 
provided before continuing with additional questions about the respondents’ perspective.  
Information about the services provided will be presented in detail in the next section. 
 
Most towns predicted the same level of privatization as is currently employed, 
with small and medium towns in particular predicting ‘remain the same’.  Larger towns 
responded quite differently with the largest response being unsure followed by no 
change.  Large towns also had a much higher percentage foreseeing increased 
privatization with one quarter of the group marking this category.  By comparison less 
than six percent of the responses in either small or medium towns were ‘increase 
privatization’.  This seems to parallel the response to the first two questions where larger 
towns were particularly concerned about inadequate revenues.  When asked to write in 
the services most likely to be privatized the most common response was janitorial 
services.  This was followed closely by building/grounds maintenance, payroll 
administration, and street repair/maintenance.   
 
 
 5.  Logistic Regression Results 
 
5.1. Correlation of fiscal stress and ideology to current management 
 
Our hypothesized model includes fiscal stress, ideology, demographics and 
geography as the key factors affecting the privatization decision.  These were regressed 
against a pooled dependent privatization choice variable.  A one indicates that a private 
contractor provides the service and a zero that another production method was employed.  
The 826 observations included eight services: solid waste disposal, recycling, street 
sweeping, parks maintenance, janitorial, building/grounds maintenance, tax assessing and 
title maintenance.  This largely disparate set of services has a generally low level of 
necessary oversight, unlike school or police services.  They also are generally well split 
between private contract and other service methods. 
 
A wide variety of variables were examined to try and capture the four key areas of 
influence in four specific variables.  The interrelated nature of these variables makes 
collinearity a problem with many of the available variables yet such a complex decision 
is unlikely to be adequately modeled with so few variables.  Using our theoretical model 
we narrowed the pool of variables considerably.  We selected only one variable in each of 
the four areas we hypothesize to have an effect on the privatization decision; fiscal stress, 
ideology, demographics and geography.  The goal of this research is to shed light on the 
direction of influence of key factors for comparison against the many theoretical models 
that exist.  The following is a description of the four variables in our model and their 
hypothesized direction of influence. 
 
Fraction of 2004 Republican Gubernatorial Votes - Conservative ideology favors smaller 
government so contracting out services is a political goal. This should create a positive 
sign as constituents have an ideological preference for private contracts[Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997]. 
 
Fiscal Stress Interaction Term – This is a multiplication of the stated fiscal condition and 
the local tax rate.  Current stated fiscal condition is translated into a one for inadequate 
revenues and a zero otherwise.  Local tax is used to reflect the pressure of non-school 
spending on the budget and constitutes a more direct connection with the services in our 
pool than the overall tax rate.  The theoretical hypothesis that privatization provides a 
relief of fiscal stress would indicate a negative relationship between high current stress 
and past private contracting.  This is our attempt create a variable to reflect the fiscal 
stress hypothesis put forward by others[Deller, 1998].  The two-part nature of this 
variable incorporates the decision to consider with the decision to contract-out [Chandler 
and Feuille, 1994]. 
 
Tax Commitment – This measure of budget size incorporates to some degree population, 
income and government size.  We expect these larger towns to have more resources to 
explore the privatization option and more savings and bids due to their scale.  At the 
same time their size may make some services cost effective to provide in house where 
smaller towns could not handle capital costs.  We hypothesize a slightly positive 
relationship.  
Geo South Dummy – The variable is a one for Rockingham, Hillsborough and Cheshire 
counties, which form the southern border with Massachusetts, and a zero for all other 
counties.  We hypothesize that the more densely populated three southernmost counties 
in New Hampshire have better access to private contactors and are more likely to receive 
competitive and cost saving bids making this relationship positive. 
 
Table 2 – Variable Summary and Logit Model of Current Privatization 
 
    Variable |Anticipated Sign        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
  fractrepub | Positive            .4879706    .0880161     .25121     .64516 
Q1fiscalst~r | Negative            2.225652    3.558638       -.35      24.53 
   taxcommit | Positive            1.04e+07    1.60e+07      79873   1.41e+08 
    geosouth | Positive            .3913043    .4898202          0          1 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        826 
                                                  LR chi2(4)      =      31.06 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -492.54967                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0306 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pooledpriv~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  fractrepub |   1.947989   .9092873     2.14   0.032      .165819     3.73016 
Q1fiscalst~r |  -.0726433   .0255089    -2.85   0.004    -.1226399   -.0226467 
   taxcommit |  -2.15e-08   7.06e-09    -3.04   0.002    -3.53e-08   -7.64e-09 
    geosouth |   .2009179    .159824     1.26   0.209    -.1123314    .5141672 
       _cons |  -1.487301   .4649559    -3.20   0.001    -2.398598   -.5760045 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
5.2. Results of our model of current management 
 
The results of the logit estimation procedure are presented in Table 2.  The 
ideological variable is significant and has the expected sign.  The fiscal stress variable 
also has the correct sign and is significant at the ninety-nine percent level.  The influence 
of total tax commitment is nearly zero, which corresponds somewhat to the hedged 
prediction made above. And finally the geography variable has the right sign but is 
ambiguous in light of its wide confidence interval.  The overall model is significant but 
provides very little explanation of the variation in our data set.   
 
The data used in this model was taken concurrently and does not allow us to 
really show a causal relationship for any of these factors.  Never the less, finding a 
significant relationship in three of the four variables provides a good deal of support for 
the theoretical influence of fiscal stress and ideology.  Interestingly these two influences 
on the privatization decision come from somewhat opposing directions.  The ideological 
influence is significant with fiscal stress and tax commitment held constant.  This seems 
to imply a political influence separate from cost-savings and economic concerns.   
 The interpretation of the fiscal stress variable is less straightforward.  Increased 
fiscal stress is occurring in communities that have privatized fewer services.  Ideological 
supporters of privatization would posit that the pursuit of private contracts has lowered 
fiscal stress in early adopters.  Conversely there may be some aspect of lower fiscal stress 
that allows municipalities to pursue private contracts.  The use of stated fiscal stress, as a 
piece of this interaction variable may also be problematic due to respondent bias.  That 
bias provides us with fiscal stress as viewed by the decision-making officials, which we 
defend as a more useful measure in the privatization decision than more abstract 
variables.  Nonetheless a possible interaction between stated fiscal stress and ideology 
must be considered. 
 
5.3. Relationship of fiscal stress, experience and ideology to predicted changes 
 
In order to test the predictive capacity of our last model we again use a logit 
regression with the same independent variables as the previous model and adding a 
variable to capture experience with private contracts.  The answer to the question of how 
privatization will change in the municipality over the next five years serves as the 
dependent variable with 1 for an increase in privatization and 0 for less or the same.  The 
new experience variable looks at the total number of services privatized in our previous 
index of eight.  A dummy variable was created with zero equal to one or no services 
privatized (below average) and a one for all other cases 
 
Fraction of 2004 Republican Gubernatorial Votes - Conservative ideology favors smaller 
government so contracting out services is a political goal. This should create a positive 
sign as constituents have an ideological preference for private contracts. 
 
Fiscal Stress Interaction Term – In this model we expect that a measure of fiscal stress in 
the near future should positively influence the rate of privatization.  Increasing budget 
pressure is expected to push towns to find alternative cost saving measures.  This variable 
incorporates the stated fiscal situation for the next five years. 
 
Tax Commitment – This measure of budget size incorporates to some degree population, 
income and government size.  We expect these larger towns to have more resources to 
explore the privatization option and more savings and bids due to their scale.  At the 
same time their size may make some services cost effective to provide in house where 
smaller towns could not handle capital costs.  We hypothesize a slightly positive 
relationship. 
 
Geo South Dummy – We expect this to continue to have positive influence as in the 
previous regression. 
 
Experience Dummy – This looks at the index in our last model and assigns a 0 to towns 
who have privatized one or none of the eight services in the index. This division 
corresponds to above and below average experience and seeks to capture the learning that 
may be occurring with these new arrangements. 
 
  
Table 3 – Variable Summary and Logit model of future privatization 
 
    Variable |Anticipated Sign       Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
  fractrepub |   Positive     .4879706    .0880161     .25121     .64516 
Q2fiscalst~r |   Positive           2.485    3.722251       -.35      24.53 
   taxcommit |   Positive    1.04e+07    1.60e+07      79873   1.41e+08 
    geosouth |   Positive      .3913043    .4898202          0          1 
expertotal~m |   Positive      .5072464    .5017688          0          1 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =         95 
                                                  LR chi2(5)      =       8.24 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.1437 
Log likelihood =  -37.31763                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0994 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Q4Privatel~m |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  fractrepub |  -3.277978   3.073316    -1.07   0.286    -9.301568    2.745611 
Q2fiscalst~r |  -.0323457   .1080034    -0.30   0.765    -.2440285    .1793371 
   taxcommit |   5.10e-08   2.32e-08     2.20   0.028     5.52e-09    9.65e-08 
    geosouth |   .4748847   .6018006     0.79   0.430    -.7046228    1.654392 
expertotal~m |   .6580231   .6257437     1.05   0.293    -.5684121    1.884458 
       _cons |  -1.106163   1.550808    -0.71   0.476    -4.145691    1.933365 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
5.4. Results from the future privatization model 
 
This model gives us so little explanatory power that the absence of any strong 
relations is notable in and of itself.  The results of the chi-squared test for this model do 
not reject the possibility of all the independent variables having no effect.  This is not 
terribly surprising due to the much smaller data set (n = 95) and increasing uncertainty 
with questions regarding future choices.  The confidence intervals range above and below 
zero making any inferences about the direction of influence highly speculative.  The 
exception is the tax commitment variable, which like our first model is near zero and has 
no real marginal effect on the outcome of the model.  Despite rather poor model 
performance these variables may suffer more from the small data set than incorrect 
specification.   
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
We have attempted to combine some measure of fiscal stress with other 
characteristics influencing the privatization decision.  As a result we have turned up little 
by way of a mechanical model for this institutional decision.  Despite a fair amount of 
literature support for ideology and fiscal stress as determinants we find little support for 
this in our sample.  Nor have our own additions of geographic location and experience 
with contracting provided real clues as to independent factors influencing municipal 
decisions.  While New Hampshire towns are stubbornly independent it is hard to believe 
that there is so little pattern in such a common decision.  Despite trying to control for 
ideology and geography we have found little indication that fiscal stress, as we have specified it, has much influence on the decision to privatize municipal services in the 
future. 
 
Our relative lack of success in modeling future privatization in our second model 
must be considered against a clear relationship between current conditions and 
management decisions demonstrated in our first model.  Existing private contracts show a 
clear relationship with ideology and fiscal stress.  The existence of a relationship between 
low current fiscal stress and increased privatization does not necessarily support the 
theoretical cost savings that we have proposed.  The use of union contracts to increase 
political patronage might indeed be analogously considered for private contracts.  The 
possibility that under low fiscal stress politicians may indeed be increasing patronage by 
the awarding of possibly lucrative private contracts could also be explored.  This second 
proposal for the relationship of fiscal stress and privatization is put forth only to 
demonstrate other possible explanations for our findings. 
 
We have proposed a fiscal stress interaction variable in order to include the 
nebulous influence of fiscal stress on municipal management decisions.  The influence of 
this variable in our first model of existing decisions justifies further exploration and 
refinement in future studies.  A longitudinal study may also provide a more useful data 
set for the second model than our use of predicted future privatization.  Despite some 
limitations we have shown both ideology and fiscal stress play a role in determining 
where privatization occurs.  Accordingly future work would benefit from incorporating 
both political and economic variables into examinations of the privatization decision at 
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